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I. AN ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK
Liberty and security stand in tension with each other.1 There are at
least some liberties that, if retained—or conferred—will lessen security.2
This conceptual claim need not be committed to any particular conception as
to which liberties those are, and it certainly does not follow that all liberties
bear some relationship to security. To be sure, they do not, which is to say
that many liberties gain no purchase at all on the security debate. But granting
that at least some do, the tension appears: should—or do3—we prefer more
liberties or more security?
This is an incredibly difficult question to answer, though there are at
least several broad approaches that might be undertaken. On the one hand,
we might think that liberties are more important than security; it is better to
be free than to be safe. On the other, we might think that security is more
important than liberty; it is better to be safe than to be free. But are these real
answers to the question? Or are they just platitudinous rhetoric?
Neither end of this spectrum portends much plausibility. If we were fully
free, we would also be perpetually at risk since unconstrained liberties could be
nefariously deployed. This sort of Hobbesian state of nature motivates our
departure into civil society and the associated restrictions on our liberties.4 Lest
the pendulum swing too far in the other direction, a police state threatens. Under
1

See, e.g., ERIC A. POSNER & ADRIAN VERMEULE, TERROR IN THE BALANCE: SECURITY,
LIBERTY, AND THE COURTS (2007) (acknowledging the trade-off between security and liberty, but
arguing that deference should be given to the executive branch in adjusting the security policy
during times of emergency). See also John Kleinig, Liberty and Security in an Era of Terrorism,
in CRIMINOLOGISTS ON TERRORISM AND HOMELAND SECURITY, 357-82 (Brian Forst, Jack R.
Greene & James P. Lynch eds., 2011) (examining the issue regarding the appropriate balance
between liberty and security during times of increased threat to national security). Though
terrorism presents a compelling context in which to consider this issue, it has been suggested in
other contexts and eras as well. See, e.g., Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944)
(finding the internment of Japanese Americans during World War II constitutional). See also
Robert H. Jackson, Wartime Security and Liberty Under Law, 1 BUFF. L. REV. 103 (1951) (highlighting the tension between liberty and security resulting from wartime stresses in U.S. history).
This was a lecture given by former Supreme Court Justice Jackson to the Buffalo Law School.
2
I will not have much to say about what liberty and security are, which is certainly important. In
this regard, Kleinig, supra note 1, is useful; I agree with his characterizations of both concepts.
3
While my project is more normative than descriptive, there is important empirical data on
the latter. See Carol W. Lewis, The Clash between Security and Liberty in the U.S. Response
to Terror, 65 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 18, 18-30 (2005) (examining the public’s opinion on the
tradeoff between security and liberty before and after 9/11).
4
THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN XII.9 (A.P. Martinich & Brian Battiste eds., Broadview
Press 2010). See also JOHN LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT 6 (1986)
(discussing the implications of a state where everyone has the power to enforce the law).
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this totalitarian regime, we may well be secure, but toward what end?5 If security
comes at too high a price, we might well reject the offer.
Without luck on the extremes, a more moderate approach looks
attractive. On such an approach, liberty and security both matter, and the aim is
to strike an adequate balance between the two.6 While this approach is not
without detractors—several of whom will be considered in § 4—it serves as a
useful starting point. Here we acknowledge the tension between liberty and
security, without taking a dogmatic approach as to which takes priority in
individual cases. Rather, there will be interplay between the two where we
will—whether judiciously or liberally—restrict liberties for the sake of security.
Still, there are at least two substantial preliminary problems. First, the
project now becomes at least partially empirical insofar as it starts to matter
whether any particular restriction on liberty improves security.7 On this tack, the
civil libertarian could avoid value judgments altogether by successfully arguing
that some curtailment of liberties just does not matter for our security. There
would still be the issue of whether people are safer or whether they feel safer;
pending the discussion in § 4, the appropriate metric has not been fixed either
way. But conceding that some restriction does not make people safer and that
promulgation of this fact precludes them from feeling safer—which surely will
not always be true—the restriction would not be offset by any compensatory
benefit. In such a case, there would be no reason to sustain it.
While more will be said about this problem later, it can somewhat be
cabined for the purposes of the theoretical project. Still, that theoretical project
borders on the irrelevant without any sort of practical upshot, so some
engagement is owed. The principal dialectical move is to simply deny that any
liberty restriction we would seriously countenance has no implications for
security; else, why affect it? Surely the critic can charitably allow that the restriction has some implications for security, the issue then becoming how much. And
once we have gotten this far, the first problem transposes into the second.
That second problem becomes one of commensurability, under which
liberty and security need to be represented in some common currency.8 This
5

ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA (1974).
In addition to striking a balance between these values, we may also want to find balance between
the modes of political enforcement. See Jeffrey Rosen, The Naked Crowd: Balancing Privacy
and Security in an Age of Terror, 46 ARIZ. L. REV. 607, 607-19 (2004) (“[D]escribing what the
technologies and legal arrangements might look like if they were modified to achieve this balance
between privacy and security; and . . . who is most likely to guarantee this effective balance.”).
7
Lewis, supra note 3, at 23.
8
The problem of commensurability and value is an old one. See HENRY SIDGWICK, THE METHODS OF ETHICS (1907) (exploring methods for making value choices and the required assumption
that pleasures and pains are commensurable). While present purposes do not require a technical
6

56

Journal of Law & Public Affairs

[May 2018

problem is even worse than it appears, because it requires not only that liberty
and security are commensurable, but also that either can be measured at all. So
even if we could say that x units of security were worth y units of liberty, we
would have to be able to say what those respective units were in the first place.
In other words, imagine that some restriction of liberty has some upshot in terms
of security; is it worth it? To answer that question, we would obviously want to
know how much security we were getting for how much liberty restriction, and
this apparently requires both: (1) that we quantify each; and (2) in common
terms. Either of these requirements seems daunting, if not insurmountable. The
way forward is to trade precision for heuristic. As an analogy, consider the weight
of a rhinoceros versus the weight of a grand piano: we do not need to know the
weight of either to know that the rhinoceros weighs more.9 This example gets us
past (1) insofar as we can make comparisons without knowing quantities. But
we are still left with (2) as the example presumes a common currency (viz.,
weight) that is inapplicable to comparisons between liberty and security.
Still, we do make adjudicative policy decisions all the time, apparently
across disparate considerations. If, for example, a gun control bill fails to clear
Congress, there is some straightforward sense in which we, as a polity, fail to
ratify the restriction on liberty that would have conferred added security.10 To be
sure, there are distortional effects in an example like this (e.g., disproportionate
lobbying power), but that just makes the point: if there were sufficient political
will, then the legislation would get through. Obviously this process generalizes
beyond the liberty/security context. Whether we think about decisions to go to
war, to offer farm subsidies, to institute performance-based evaluations in public
schools, or any other complex policy decision, a wide range of apparently
incommensurable values are put in conflict. That we do adjudicate those
conflicts shows that we can, even if it does not elucidate how.11
conception of commensurability, this suffices: “[t]wo items are commensurable if and only if
there is some single norm such that consideration for and against choosing each item may be
adequately arrayed prior to the choice (for purposes of deliberation” simply in terms of the greater
or lesser satisfaction of the single norm.” Henry S. Richardson, Commensurability as a Prerequisite of Rational Choice: An Examination of Sidgwick’s Position, 8 HIST. OF PHIL. Q. 181 (1991).
9
In an informal poll I conducted among my colleagues and students, ninety-one percent of
those asked got the answer right, but their answers on relative weights varied by 6,000% (n =
11). The average rhinoceros weighs two or three times as much as the average grand piano.
10
See, e.g., Ed O’Keefe, Gun Background Check, Assault Weapon Compromise Fail in Senate,
WASH. POST, Apr. 17, 2013, http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/post-politics/wp/2013/04/
17/senate-to-vote-on-amendments-to-gun-bill-with-background-check-plan-in-doubt (explaining that proposal to expand the national gun background system lacked the votes required to pass).
11
See Richard F. Elmore, Backward Mapping: Implementation Research and Policy
Decisions, 94 POL. SCI. Q. 601, 601-16 (1979) (discussing forward mapping and backward
mapping approaches to implementation analysis).
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The fact that there is partisan disagreement over some of these issues
complicates things issue, though not irretrievably so.12 To return to our
example, suppose that there are two reasonable views one could take about
gun control. One of these sides will prevail, while the other will not; there
either will, or will not, be background checks, magazine restrictions, and so
on. This does not preclude that there could be compromise within or across
the relevant parameters, but rather only presupposes that at least some
reasonable people will be unhappy with the eventual outcome. There are two
possible explanations here. First, people could simply ascribe different values
to those outcomes; in other words, they just fundamentally disagree about
what a good outcome would look like.13 Second, their commitments might be
sufficiently coarse so as to render any particular outcome indeterminate. In
other words, those commitments might have enough imprecision that the
disagreement is effectively spurious; it reflects, not a failure of ultimate
agreement, but rather of epistemic resolution and articulation.14
Whether the disagreement is thoroughgoing or provisional, it need not
derail our attempt at commensurability. In either case, the inter-personal tension
is substantively akin to the intra-personal one, which is to say that competing
values that some particular individual has are ultimately adjudicated when she
expresses her considered policy preference. The inter-personal tension is
similarly adjudicated when society ultimately speaks—i.e., when it adopts some
particular policy—since, as a first approximation, it has internalized the intrapersonal values of its constituents.
This section has been admittedly abstract, so it will be useful to
recapitulate the key ideas before moving on. In thinking through the tension
between liberty and security, neither takes absolute preeminence over the
other. Rather, there is a trade-off between the two under which some
augmentation of security is worth some restriction on liberty.15 This highly
formalistic answer takes no substantive position on how much of one is worth
12

See AMY GUTMAN & DENNIS THOMPSON, DEMOCRACY AND DISAGREEMENT: WHY MORAL
CONFLICT CANNOT BE AVOIDED IN POLITICS, AND WHAT SHOULD BE DONE ABOUT IT (1996)
(reflecting on the implications of political disagreement and proposing ways to address it). See
also Charles Larmore, Pluralism and Reasonable Disagreement, 11 SOC. PHIL. & POL’Y 61
(1994) (recognizing an inevitable disagreement about the nature of the good life).
13
John Doris & Alexandra Plakias, How to Argue about Disagreement: Evaluative Diversity
and Moral Realism, in MORAL PSYCHOLOGY: THE COGNITIVE SCIENCE OF MORALITY:
INTUITION AND DIVERSITY, 303 (Walter Sinnott-Armstrong ed., 2008). See also Sarah
McGrath, Moral Disagreement and Moral Expertise, 3 OXFORD STUD. IN METAETHICS 87
(2008) (examining to what extent does moral disagreement undermine moral knowledge).
14
Thomas Nagel, Moral Conflict and Political Legitimacy, 16 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 215, 215-40 (1987).
15
Kleinig, supra note 1, at 377-79.
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how much of the other; the commitment is simply that the two are commensurable, at least heuristically if not quantitatively.16 Moving forward, the
discussion will be concretized by considering particular ways in which
liberties and security interact.
II. APPLYING THE FRAMEWORK
In will be useful to see how, in practice, the tension between liberties
and security is manifest. The hope is that we can gain greater purchase on the
theoretical discussion by exemplifying it. Furthermore, § 4 will consider
criticisms of the view that I defend, and those criticisms come both at the
theoretical and practical levels. By presenting a practical discussion to
complement the theoretical one, both a fuller picture will be developed and
more critical work will be able to be incorporated. To put it another way, the
theoretical and practical discussions take parallel tracks, yet both tracks head
in the same direction vis-à-vis ultimate conclusions. This section therefore
presents another dimension of the framework—viz., its application—and will
be useful moving forward.
While there is a range of examples that illustrate the tension between
liberty and security, the focus here will be on just two: the USA PATRIOT
Act and aviation security. In many ways, these are the most visible of our
responses to terrorism, and their implications the most widely discussed.
They are also both highly politicized, with passionate supporters and
detractors. Furthermore, there are—or least let us charitably suppose—
reasonable views on both sides of the debate. By exploring the associated
contours, we can gain a clearer focus on the more general project.
That said, nothing in particular hangs on either of the two examples.
Per above, it will be useful to have some specific examples on the table, but
it matters not so much what the examples are. The ones I am presenting here
are tied to the terrorism context, which is on purpose: terrorism and
counterterrorism constitute the interface at which the tension between liberty
and security is most pronounced. And, in the public conscience, this context
is the one in which that tension is most viscerally felt. The overall discussion,
though, generalizes beyond terrorism.
For example, as already mentioned, gun control is another context in
which liberty is pitted against security. As it stands, we have various liberties
with regards to guns (e.g., to purchase them without background checks at
16

See Hillel Steiner, How Free?: Computing Personal Liberty, in OF LIBERTY, 73-90 (A.
Philips Griffiths ed., Cambridge University Press, 1983) (elaborating on the difficulties of
quantifying liberties).
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gun shows, to load them with high-capacity magazines, to deploy them with
certain firing rates, etc.). Particularly in the aftermath of school shootings,
many—predominantly, but not exclusively liberals17—think that these
liberties should be curtailed under the aegis of increased security, whether for
the benefit of schoolchildren or for society at large. This debate is therefore
isomorphic to the ones that we will consider with regards to the USA
PATRIOT Act and aviation security, the only difference being that it does
not (directly) relate to terrorism.18 At any rate, this is a minor disclaimer that
need not detract from the central argument.
A. USA PATRIOT Act
The USA PATRIOT Act19 was signed into law by President Bush
within two months of 9/11; it was a direct response to those terrorist acts.20
The title of the legislation is important, even if it goes unnoticed, or is
misunderstood. USA PATRIOT Act is an acronym that stands for “Uniting
and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to
Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism.” Of course, many of us know this, but the
general public almost certainly thinks that “USA” stands for “United States
of America” and that “patriot” is part of the title, not an implicated metaphor;
neither presumption is true. But why does the title matter? For present
purposes, the answer is that the title straightforwardly ties to liberty and
security, specifically by empowering law enforcement with tools to stop
terrorism. Those tools obviously confer security, but at the cost of liberties.
While a complete discussion of the Act’s provisions is unnecessary for
present purposes, some of those provisions are worth highlighting.21 Many of
17

Larry Alan Burns, A Conservative Case for an Assault Weapons Ban, L.A. TIMES, (Dec. 20,
2012), http://articles.latimes.com/2012/dec/20/opinion/la-oe-burns-assault-weapons-ban-201212
20. Judge Burns is the Republican-appointed judge who oversaw the trial and sentencing of Jared
Lee Loughner—Loughner perpetrated a mass shooting in Tucson, Arizona in 2011, killing six
people and injuring U.S. Representative Gabrielle Giffords and federal judge John Roll.
18
Of course it might relate indirectly insofar as gun control has implications for the guns to which
terrorists have access, but terrorism is not the primary context in which gun control is presented.
19
H.R. 3162, 107th Cong., 115 Stat. 272 (2001).
20
See, e.g., American Civil Liberties Union, Reclaiming Patriotism: A Call to Reconsider
the Patriot Act 1, 5 (2009) [hereinafter ACLU] (identifying the Patriot Act provisions “that
require intensive oversight and modification to prevent abuse”).
21
For more discussion, see Fritz Allhoff, The War on Terror and the Ethics of Exceptionalism, 8 J. OF MIL. ETHICS 265, 265-88 (2009) (explaining that the USA PATRIOT Act
contained various “sunset provisions” that were set to expire in 2005; however, these were
made permanent by Congress).
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them were originally set to expire in 2005,22 though were subsequently
renewed.23 Ultimately, the legislation increases the surveillance power of the
government, and in controversial ways. The most important new surveillance
powers are these:
(1) the ability to conduct surveillance on a particular target
regardless of the specific communications provider and
facility the target uses [i.e., the “roving wiretap”; § 206] . . . ;
(2) the ability to conduct surveillance on non-U.S. persons
who are not affiliated with any known terrorist organizations
[i.e., “lone wolf” terrorists; § 207] . . . ; and (3) the ability to
obtain a court order (provided certain conditions are met) for
any tangible item, including documents [i.e., the “library
records” provision; § 215] . . . .24
22

For the complete list, see CHARLES DOYLE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 32186, USA
PATRIOT ACT: SUNSET PROVISIONS THAT EXPIRE ON DECEMBER 31, 2005 (2004). The list
includes: § 201 (wiretapping in terrorism cases); §202 (wiretapping in computer fraud and
abuse felony cases); § 203(b) (sharing wiretap information); §203(d) (sharing foreign
intelligence information); § 204 (Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) pen
register/trap and trace exceptions); § 206 (roving FISA wiretaps); § 207 (duration of FISA
surveillance of non-US persons who are agents of a foreign power); § 209 (seizure of voicemail messages pursuant to warrants); § 212 (emergency disclosure of electronic surveillance); § 214 (FISA pen register/trap and trace authority); §215 (FISA access to tangible
items); § 217 (interception of computer trespasser communications); §218 (purpose for FISA
orders); §220 (nationwide service of search warrants for electronic evidence); § 223 (civil
liability and discipline for privacy violations); and § 225 (provider immunity for FISA
wiretap assistance. Id. (adapted from Jonathan Marks, 9/11 + 3/11 + 7/7 = ?: What Counts
in Counterterrorism, 37 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 121 (2006)).
23
The USA PATRIOT Act was renewed and amended through three subsequent pieces of
legislation. The first piece of legislation was the USA Patriot Improvement and Reauthorization Act of 2005. USA Improvement and Reauthorization Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109177, 120 Stat. 192 (2006). The second piece of legislation was the USA PATRIOT Act
Additional Reauthorizing Amendments Act of 2006. USA PATRIOT Act Additional
Reauthorizing Amendments Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-178, 120 Stat. 278 (2006). For
analysis of this piece of legislation, see CHARLES DOYLE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV.,
RS22216, USA PATRIOT ACT REAUTHORIZATION IN BRIEF (2005). The third piece of
legislation was PATRIOT Sunsets Extension Act of 2011. PATRIOT Sunsets Extension Act
of 2011, Pub. L. No. 112-114, 125 Stat. 216 (2011). See EDWARD C. LIU, CONG. RESEARCH
SERV., R40138, AMENDMENTS TO THE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE ACT (FISA)
EXTENDED UNTIL JUNE 1, 2015 (2011) (discussing the extension of the three amendments
and their respective expansion of federal intelligence-gathering authorities’ scope).
24
Philip M. Bridwell & Jamil N. Jaffer, Updating the Counterterrorism Toolkit: A Brief Sampling
of Post-9/11 Surveillance Laws and Authorities, in THE LAW OF COUNTERTERRORISM 232 (Lynne
K. Zusman ed., 2012). For a more comprehensive—if bombastic and heavy-handed—discussion,
see John W. Whitehead & Steven H. Aden, Forfeiting “Enduring Freedom” for “Homeland
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Each of these provisions restricts certain liberties, most generally liberties
against being surveilled. Still, it will be useful to look at them individually.
The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) is amended by §
206, which allows for roving wiretaps. The amended legislation weakens
privacy protections since surveillance orders no longer require the specification of a particular location, phone number, or internet account, nor do they
require the identification of a particular target.25 While FISA had typically
required that a surveillance target be affiliated with a foreign power (e.g., a
foreign government or foreign terrorist organization), § 207 makes possible
the surveillance of “lone wolf” terrorists, namely terrorists without an
established connection to a foreign power. A motivation for this provision
was that, prior to 9/11, the FBI could not tie Zacarias Moussaoui to a foreign
terrorist organization and therefore was unable to examine his laptop; § 207
would have made such an examination possible.26
Prior to 9/11, FISA allowed the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance
Court (FISC) to issue orders requiring third parties to supply business records
of suspected terrorists, pursuant to a government investigation. However,
requests could only be served upon four types of entities: common carriers
(e.g., airlines and bus companies); establishments of public accommodation
(e.g., hotels); storage locker facilities; and vehicle rental agencies.27 Under §
215, however, the FISA business records provision was amended in three
principal ways. First, the supplying entities no longer had to fall into one of
the aforementioned categories. Second, “business records” was replaced with
“any tangible things (including books, records, papers, documents, and other
items);” this substantially expands the scope of materials that can be
requested. Third, § 215 eliminates the requirement that the government show
the person against whom materials are requested is a foreign power or agent
of foreign power. Rather, the government only need to certify that the records
are germane to a national security investigation.28
These provisions compromise liberties in straightforward ways.
Under § 206, an individual can be surveilled without previously-required
Security”: A Constitutional Analysis of the USA Patriot Act and the Justice Department’s AntiTerrorism Initiatives, 51 AM. U. L. REV. 1079, 1079-1133 (2002) (“[W]hile Congress’ antiterrorism law, the so-called Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools
Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (‘Patriot Act’) may not have been designed to
restrict American citizens’ civil liberties, its unintended consequences threaten the fundamental
constitutional rights of people who have absolutely no involvement with terrorism.”).
25
Bridwell & Jaffer, supra note 24, at 239-40.
26
Two restrictions on § 207 are worth noting, namely that it cannot be exercised against
Americans or permanent residents and that it only applies to “international terrorism.”
27
Bridwell & Jaffer, supra note 24, at 241.
28
Id.
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government specifications, which is to say that more surveillance is possible
and that liberty against that surveillance is therefore curtailed. To put it
another way, the government may surveil individuals post-§ 206 that it could
not surveil pre-§ 206, whether because certain conditions that would have
prevented their surveillance no longer immunize them (e.g., failure to name
the individual, location, phone number, or internet account). The lone-wolf
allowance of § 207 also expands the number of people that can be surveilled;
non-affiliation with a foreign power is no longer sufficient for immunity.
Furthermore, § 215 expands the sorts of materials that can be surveilled,
which means that liberties that individuals had vis-à-vis “any tangible
thing[s]” that were not “business records” have been eviscerated.
Not surprisingly, civil libertarians have expressed dismay about these
developments.29 The ACLU complained that “[b]y expanding the government’s
authority to secretly search private records and monitor communications, often
without any evidence of wrongdoing, the Patriot Act [sic] eroded our most basic
right—the freedom from unwarranted government introduction into our private
lives…”30 Here, one certainly has to wonder why this would be out most basic
right, as opposed to, say, the right to life, a right whose redemption may well
require security and, therefore, at least some infringement on liberty. They
acknowledge that proponents of the USA PATRIOT Act “suggest that reducing
individual liberties during a time of increased threat to our national security is
both reasonable and necessary,”31 but decry this reduction as a poisonous
interpretation of our Founders’ vision. While much of their presentation is
rhetorical, their basic idea is that liberty takes priority over security and that we
must not capitulate on the former to promote the latter.
This is exactly the sort of incommensurability approach that I rejected
in § 1. On such an approach, it really does not matter how substantial the
terrorist threat is; if we take the ACLU at its word, it is just unwilling to
compromise on liberty despite countervailing security concerns. Surely this
goes too far. The justification of the USA PATRIOT Act cannot hinge on
29

Whitehead & Aden, supra note 24, are concerned with Fourth Amendment violations since
various USA PATRIOT Act provisions relax the standard of probable cause. Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence would take us too far afield for present purposes, but let me register my skepticism.
The Fourth Amendment protects against unreasonable searches and seizures, and we can
certainly allow that the context of terrorism lowers the requisite justification. The probable cause
standard was promulgated in Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925), but Illinois v. Gates,
462 U.S. 213 (1983), introduced a complementary notion of “totality of the circumstances.”
Given my pluralistic predilections, I would transfer rigid emphasis on probable cause to a more
permissive standard under which probable cause generally controlled, but was contextually defeasible. Prospective terrorist attacks would almost certainly portend such a defeating condition.
30
ACLU, supra note 20, at 7.
31
Id. at 8.
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whether it adversely affects liberties since this sets the bar far too low. Rather,
the appropriate metric has to be whether those adverse effects are worth it, a
calculus that the ACLU completely rejects. The commensurability approach
that I defend queries not just adverse effects on liberties—which we can
stipulate to exist—but also the upshot in terms of security.
A better critique would therefore be to say that this legislation has
adverse effects for liberty that are not offset by corresponding gains in
security. It is very hard to think through how to analyze such a claim,
particularly given the paucity of empirical data about how many terrorist
threats the USA PATRIOT Act has prevented. Interestingly, the government
claims that it has never invoked § 207, but my inclination is to think that
liberties are compromised whether the government actually invokes the
provision or not; the freedom against surveillance is lost regardless.
Similarly, with § 206 and § 215, the fact that individuals could be subject to
roving wiretaps or third-party requisition of materials inherently compromises liberty, even if those powers are not exercised.
Therefore, we should concede the loss of liberty expansively, but such
a conceptualization is not dispositive against the legislation. Rather, it just
calls for greater countervailing gains in terms of security; a large imposition
against liberty can still be offset by an appropriate security gain. The issue of
how much liberty is worth how much security still obtains, and reasonable
people will surely disagree. But, as a conceptual matter, even the prevention
of a single terrorist attack could justify substantial infringements against
liberty if the costs of that attack are high enough. An accounting of those costs
is still owed—and will be offered in § 3—but let us turn to aviation security
in the meantime.
B. Aviation Security
The liberties sacrificed under the USA PATRIOT Act are largely
unfelt and unseen; for the vast majority of Americans, this legislation has no
material impact on our lives. To be sure, many of us take great umbrage at
the potential invasions of their privacy, but the invasions themselves remain
substantially unrealized. Aviation security stands diametrically opposed in
this regard, with millions of Americans being daily subjected to its demands.
That 9/11 was perpetuated by airplanes hardly makes it a surprise that
aviation security has become a post-9/11 focal point. The effect is
unmistakable, particularly via the increased burdens on travelers.
Already explicit in the locution, aviation security seeks to secure air
travel; it does so by restricting liberties that people would otherwise have.
Just think of the process that it now takes to get on an airplane. We must
remove our laptops from their carrying cases, take off belts, sweaters, jackets,

64

Journal of Law & Public Affairs

[May 2018

and shoes, and then go through a metal detector, a backscatter x-ray machine,
or a body scanner.32 The whole process is rife with foregone liberties, namely
the liberty against boarding a plane absent any of these screening procedures.
Of course, one has the liberty to take a pass on air travel altogether, but that
misses the point; the liberty to participate in air travel without being subject
to these screenings is still triaged.
Of course, aviation security existed prior to 9/11.33 The contemporary
version then, is not so much a sharp break from the past as the tightening of
screws along a continuum. Some of the changes are subtle, like the removal
of shoes. This policy owes to would-be shoe bomber Richard Reid, a British
citizen who, just three months after 9/11, smuggled explosives onto a plane.
The explosives had been located in his shoe, though they did not detonate,
whether from perspiration of rainy conditions in Paris before he embarked.34
Ever since, Americans have been forced to remove their shoes at security
checkpoints, a practice that has drawn the ire of myriad passengers.35
Imaging technologies are another new development at airport checkpoints. Traditionally, metal detectors constituted the primary screening metric
for passengers. However, metal detectors were unable to detect non-metallic
bombs, and imaging technologies offer greater security in that regard. They
32

In 2013, the Transportation Security Administration introduced a new program, TSA Pre✓
that “allows select frequent flyers of participating airlines…to receive expedited screening
benefits.” Sally Black, TSA Pre Check Program, VACATION KIDS, https://www.vacation
kids.com/Vacations-with-kids/bid/320962/TSA-Pre-Check-Program. These benefits include
“leaving on shoes, light outerwear and belts . . . [and] leaving laptops . . . in carry-on bags.” Id.
This has had substantial benefits to those who qualify, but will not displace security protocols for
other travelers. For more detail, see TSA PRE✓, http://www.tsa.gov/tsa-precheck. CLEAR is
another program—currently being piloted at select airports—that accelerates security checks for
subscribers; an annual membership is $179. How it Works, CLEAR, https://www.clearme.
com/how-it-works. For more details, see CLEAR, http://www.clearme.com.
33
Such aviation security existed at least for the vast majority of travelers, at least to some
extent. As recently as 2007, I took a plane from Armidale to Sydney (Australia) and was
astounded to find that travelers just walked on the plane without any screening. Armidale is
predominantly a New South Wales farm town, but that just seems irrelevant, particularly
since the plane was headed toward a crowded metropolitan center.
34
Reid ultimately pled guilty to multiple criminal counts of terrorism and was sentenced to
life without parole at a super maximum security (Supermax) prison in Florence, Colorado.
He since has undertaken various hunger strikes in protest of his conditions of confinement.
Lee Moran, Shoe Bomber in Supermax: Richard Reid Pictured for First Time Inside High
Security Prison, DAILY MAIL (Oct. 10, 2011), http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article2047093/Shoe-bomber-Richard-Reid-pictured-inside-US-Supermax-jail.html.
35
Steven Frischling, 10 Years Ago Today Airline Travelers Lost Their Shoes, BOARDING
AREA, (Dec. 22, 2011), http://flyingwithfish.boardingarea.com/2011/12/22/10-years-agotoday-airline-travelers-lost-their-shoes.
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effectively come in two sorts, backscatter x-ray and body scanner, the latter using
millimeter wave technology. Due to health concerns, backscatter x-ray devices
are being supplanted by the body scanner,36 even though the Transportation
Security Administration (TSA) has downplayed risks.37
From the outset, critics decried body imaging as an assault on privacy.
The principal worry was that the technology revealed intimate details about
the people it screened, that the images produced were personalized and
represented the screened as “nearly naked.”38 Technology has mitigated
many of these concerns, however, with software updates that produce generic
avatars as opposed to personal renderings. Other safeguards have also been
implemented, such as that the images taken cannot be stored or transmitted;
they are only available for viewing and are summarily deleted thereafter.39
Furthermore, the images are kept off-network so hackers cannot access them.
Let us grant that the transition from backscatter to millimeter wave
technology is a positive one for health risks and that improved software alleviates
many privacy concerns. Still, imaging compromises liberties. No longer are
passengers free to pass through security checkpoints un-imaged, or at least
without submitting to additional protocols (e.g., pat-downs).40 Some would-be
travelers even take these impositions so personally that they elect not to fly at
all; in other words, they feel—whether reasonably or otherwise is beside the
point—that their flying experience has been so encumbered as to be unredeemable.41 Imaging may have an upshot in terms of security, but that upshot is
certainly offset by imaging’s effect on liberties.
36

Michael Grabell, TSA Removes X-Ray Body Scanners from Major Airports, PRO PUBLICA,
(Oct. 19, 2012), https://www.propublica.org/article/tsa-removes-x-ray-body-scanners-frommajor-airports.
37
According to the TSA, one backscatter scan produces the same radiation exposure as being
on board a flying aircraft for two minutes. The TSA also claims that millimeter wave
technology is said to emit thousands of times less energy than a cell phone transmission.
Transportation Security Administration, Safety (2013), https://www.tsa.gov/blog/2012/01/
17/truth-about-tsa-testing-technology-radiation.
38
John Hughes, Airport “Naked Image” Scanners May Get Privacy Upgrades, BLOOMBERG,
(Sept. 8, 2010), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2010-09-08/airport-naked-image-scannersin-u-s-may-get-avatars-to-increase-privacy.html.
39
Or at least so says the TSA. There might be a workaround when then machines are set to
“test” mode. See Kim Zetter, Airport Scanners Can Store, Transmit Images, WIRED, (Jan.
11, 2010), https://www.wired.com/2010/01/airport-scanners (noting that although the machines possess functions that enable them to store and send images, screeners at the airport are
not able to put the machines into “test” mode to access those functions).
40
One interesting advantage of the new technologies is how they are actually less invasive for
certain demographics: those wearing metallic prosthetics would have alerted a metal detector,
but can pass through imaging technology without being called for secondary screening.
41
Hughes, supra note 38.
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In addition to the physical screening of carry-ons and persons, a more
subtle sort of screening has been rolled out post-9/11. This is behavioral
profiling, which has been a longstanding practice at Israeli airports, and is new
at American ones; it runs under the acronym SPOT, “Screening Passengers by
Observation Techniques.”42 There are approximately 3,000 behavioral detection officers working at 161 domestic airports, meaning that behavioral
profiling has quickly been distributed since appropriations began in 2007.43
Furthermore, these appropriations are already in excess of $800M, which gives
a sense for the large scale.44
In behavioral profiling, TSA agents ask travelers basic questions,
ranging from general conversation to details travelers’ trips. The content of the
answers plays a lesser role than the way in which passengers give those
answers; agents are looking for “behaviors and appearances that deviate from
an established baseline and that may be indicative of stress, fear, or
deception.”45 Relevant indicators in that regard might be eye movement,
perspiration, facial muscle movement, and so on, but operators have been
reluctant to provide fuller details. A positive indication generates “referral
screening,” which involves additional questioning and a physical search.46
Criticisms of this practice abound. TSA deployed behavioral profiling
“before first determining whether there is a scientific basis for the program.”47
The main worry here is that SPOT officers may literally do no better than chance
in picking out deception,48 and that false hits abound.49 Much of the scientific
literature on this subject is inconclusive, though there are certainly grounds for
skepticism. Still, do false positives wholly compromise the case for behavioral
profiling? It seems to me the greater concern is that of a false negative: what
happens when officers let through a threat?
42

Tovia Smith, Next in Line for the TSA?: A Thorough ‘Chat-Down’, NPR, (Aug. 16, 2011),
http://www.npr.org/2011/08/16/139643652/next-in-line-for-the-tsa-a-thorough-chat-down.
43
Sharon Weinberger, Intent to Deceive?, 465 NATURE 412 (May 27, 2010).
44
JENNIFER A. GROVER, GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-11-461T, TSA IS TAKING
STEPS TO VALIDATE THE SCIENCE UNDERLYING ITS PASSENGER BEHAVIOR DETECTION
PROGRAM, BUT EFFORTS MAY NOT BE COMPREHENSIVE, 1-2 (2011).
45
Id.
46
Id.
47
Id. at 3.
48
For more discussion, see ALDERT VRIJ, DETECTING LIES AND DECEIT (2000). See also
Samantha Mann, et al., Detecting True Lies, 89 J. OF APPLIED PSYCHOL. 137, 137-49 (2004)
(finding that “[p]olice officers can detect truths and lies above the level of chance and
accuracy is related to experience with interviewing suspects.”).
49
Weinberger tells of a traveler who was detained, ostensibly because he possessed Arabic flash
cards and a book critical of U.S. foreign policy. Weinberger, supra note 43, at 412. It is unclear
what behavioral cues tripped the officers, though the detainee was an innocent college student.
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This ties back to the broader discussion of the tension between liberty
and security. In some ways, everyone who is subject to behavioral profiling has
lost liberty, namely the liberty against being observed or questioned. Or, granting
that these are liberties rarely retained in public settings, at least liberties from
elevated observance and questioning are lost. The innocent person subject to a
false positive is deprived of even more liberties, potentially including a lengthy
delay with adverse effects on travel and beyond. But these lost liberties factor
into a broader calculus under which a missed terrorist could do much damage. If
the system is no better than chance, then $800M+ hardly seems justified, but TSA
is conducting a scientific review, and more information may soon be available.50
The broader point, though, is simply that the details will matter and that the propensity for false positives should not be dispositive against behavioral profiling.
A final way in which aviation security threatens liberties differentially
attaches to ethnic and religious minorities.51 Some of the differential treatment
50

Weinberger, supra note 43, at 412-13.
President Trump’s proposed travel bans threaten to exacerbate these disparities. On January 27,
2017, President Trump issued an executive order barring citizens of Iran, Iraq, Libya, Somali,
Sudan, Syria, and Yemen from entering the United States; it also suspended the United States’
refugee program with regards to these countries for 120 days, except Syrian refugees, who were
suspended indefinitely. Exec. Order No. 13,769, 82 Fed. Reg. 8977 (Jan. 27, 2017), revoked by
Exec. Order No. 13,780, 82 Fed. Reg. 13209 (March 6, 2017). A federal judge in New York
issued an emergency injunction against this ban on January 28, 2017, which was followed by
another temporary stay by a federal judge in Boston the following day. Darweesh v. Trump, No.
17 Civ. 480, 2017 WL 388504 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 28, 2017). See also U.S. Judge Bars Deportations
under Trump Travel Ban, FOX NEWS (Jan. 29, 2017), http://www.foxnews.com/us/2017/01/29/
us-judge-bars-deportations-under-trump-travel-ban.html (report-ing that U.S. District Judge Ann
Donnelly’s “emergency order . . . temporarily barred the U.S. from deporting people from nations
subject to President Donald Trump’s travel ban”); Shannon Dooling, Boston Federal Court Puts
Hold on Trump’s Travel, Refugees Ban, WBUR (Jan. 29, 2017), http://www.wbur.org/news/20
17/01/29/boston-ruling-trump-executive-order (reporting the temporary restraining order issued
by Judge Allison Burroughs and Magistrate Judge Judith Dein). On January 30, President Trump
fired acting Attorney General Sally Yates, who refused to defend the travel ban. White House
Statement On Firing of Acting Attorney General Sally Yates, FOX NEWS (Jan. 30, 2017), http://
www.foxnews.com/politics/2017/01/30/white-house-statement-on-firing-acting-attorney-general
-sally-yates.html (reporting then-acting Attorney General Sally Yates’ firing by the White House).
On February 1, 2017, the administration refined the travel ban to exempt permanent legal
residents of the United States. Matthew Nussbaum, White House Tweaks Trump’s Travel Ban to
Exempt Green Card Holders, POLITICO (Feb. 1, 2017), https://www.politico.com/story/2017/02/
white-house-green-card-holders-no-longer-covered-by-trump-executive-order-234505 (explaining that that the travel ban was reinterpreted to “exempt legal permanent residents of the United
States”). On February 3, 2017, another federal judge in Boston declined to extend a restraining
order against the ban, while a federal judge in Seattle temporarily blocked it again. See Judge
Declines to Extend Trump Travel Ban Restraining Order, FOX NEWS (Feb. 3, 2017), http://www.
foxnews.com/politics/2017/02/03/judge-declines-to-extend-trump-travel-ban-restraining-order.h
tml (reporting that U.S. District Judge Nathaniel Gorton “refused to extend a temporary injunction
51
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is transparent, and some is not. Starting with the former, U.S.-bound passengers
from fourteen countries— including Yemen, Nigeria, and Saudi Arabia—face
mandatory full-body pat-downs, extra luggage checks, and explosive detection
against President Donald Trump’s travel ban” and “declined to renew an order prohibiting the
detention or removal of persons as part of Trump’s executive order on refugees and immigrants”);
US Judge Temporarily Blocks Trump’s Travel Ban Nationwide, FOX NEWS (Feb. 3, 2017), http://
www.foxnews.com/us/2017/02/03/us-judge-temporarily-blocks-trump-travel-ban-nationwide.ht
ml (“A U.S. judge . . . temporarily blocked President Donald Trump’s ban on people from seven
predominantly Muslim countries after Washington state and Minnesota urged a nationwide hold
on the executive order that has launched legal battles across the country.”).
On February 6, 2017, the administration asked the Ninth Circuit to intervene and reverse the
order of the Seattle judge. Reply in Support of Emergency Motion for Stay Pending Appeal,
Washington v. Trump, 2017 WL 492504 (9th Cir. 2017) (No. 17-35105). See also Justice
Department Asks Appeals Court to Restore Trump Travel Ban, FOX NEWS (Feb. 6, 2017), http://
www.foxnews.com/politics/2017/02/06/justice-department-asks-appeals-court-to-restore-trumptravel-ban.html (providing that the Department of Justice filed appeals asking the courts to restore
the travel ban). The Ninth Circuit unanimously upheld the ban’s suspension on February 9, 2017.
Washington v. Trump, 947 F.3d 1151 (9th Cir. 2017). On February 13, 2017, a federal judge in
Virginia granted an injunction against the administration’s implementation of the ban. Aziz v.
Trump, 234 F.Supp.3d 724 (E.D. VA 2017).
On March 6, 2017, President Trump reissued the travel ban with some changes, such as
removing Iraq and exempting permanent residents and visa holders. Exec. Order No. 13,780, 82
Fed. Reg. 13209 (March 6, 2017). Hawaii then sued, and a federal judge granted its request for a
temporary restraining order. Hawaii v. Trump, 233 F.Supp.3d 850 (D. Haw. 2017). This order
was extended two weeks later, and the administration again petitioned the Ninth Circuit for relief.
Hawaii v. Trump, 245 F.Sipp.3d 1227 (D. Haw. 2017). Months later, on May 25, 2017, the Fourth
Circuit again blocked the ban. Int’l Refugee Assistance Project v. Trump, 857 F.3d 554 (4th Cir.
2017). However, the Supreme Court allowed for the travel ban to be implemented on June 26,
2017, albeit in a more limited version. Trump v. Int’l Refugee Assistance Project, 137 S.Ct. 2080
(2017). For example, the Court provided that “§ 2(c) [of the Executive Order, or EO-2] may not
be enforced against foreign nationals who have a credible claim of a bona fide relationship with
a person or entity in the United States. [However], all other foreign nationals are subject o the
provision of EO-2.” Id. at 2089. See also Melanie Zanona, White House Outlines Who Can Travel
under Trump’s Ban, THE HILL (June 29, 2017), http://thehill.com/policy/national-security/340
095-white-house-outlines-who-can-travel-under-trumps-ban (reporting on the White House’s
guidance that was issued in response to the Supreme Court’s decision). On September 7, 2017,
the Ninth Circuit expanded the interpretation of “bona fide relationship” to include more family
members, such as grandparents, in-laws, aunts and uncles, nephews and nieces, and cousins. State
v. Trump, 971 F.3d 646 (9th Cir. 2017).
A third version of the travel ban came out on September 24, 2017, including citizens of Chad,
Iran, Libya, North Korea, Somalia, Syria, and Yemen, as well as some government officials from
Venezuela. Proclamation No. 9645, 82 Fed. Reg. 45161 (Sept. 24, 2017). In December 2017, the
Supreme Court issued two stay orders. Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S.Ct. 542 (2017). On January 19,
2018, the Supreme Court announced it would hear oral argument in April and issue a final ruling
by June. Josh Gerstein, Supreme Court To Hear Case Over Trump’s Revised Travel Ban,
POLITICO (Jan. 19, 2018), http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2018/01/19/supreme-court-announ
ces-it-will-rule-on-trumps-travel-ban.html.
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sweeps. These added measures apply if those passengers hold passports from the
listed countries—or are embarking within them— and destined for the U.S.
Some of the countries are designated by the U.S. as state sponsors of terrorism,
whereas others are designated as “countries of interest.”52 While the civil rights
and Muslim anti-discrimination groups have decried this practice as tantamount
to racial discrimination, the U.S. has tied it to security.
While this constitutes U.S. official policy, abuse of discretion portends
another way in which minorities may face added scrutiny. Screeners at Newark
Liberty Airport were charged with racially profiling Mexican and Dominican
passengers;53 four of these screeners were ultimately fired, and dozens more
suspended.54 Mexican travelers were also allegedly targeted for secondary
screening at Honolulu International Airport.55 Sikhs have long complained of
profiling, and a thorny issue herein emerges given their religious use of turbans
and the associated security issues that such headwear raises.56 Since secondary
screening is often discretionary, it is simply hard to know if minorities subjected
to that screening are subjected under good faith or are differentially targeted
given their minority status. And this issue gets even trickier when considering
that differential targeting could result from unconscious or implicit bias, not
necessarily from screeners’ willful misconduct.
Differential targeting raises a whole host of concerns. While more
universally-applied measures infringe greater amounts of liberty overall, at least
they do so without prejudice. But, in terms of the calculus between liberty and
security, where is the upshot? Prejudicial enforcement infringes less liberty than
ubiquitous enforcement (i.e., by enforcing against fewer people), which is a
prima facie good. To take an example, the U.S. could solve the differential
enforcement against citizens or passengers from the fourteen listed countries by
subjugating all passengers to elevated screenings. This might appease our moral
outrage, but does that make it good policy?
52

Peter Grier, US-Bound Passengers from 14 Countries Face New Airport Security,
CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR, (Jan. 10, 2010), https://www.csmonitor.com/USA/2010/
0104/US-bound-passengers-from-14-countries-face-new-airport-security.
53
Steve Strunsky, Report: Newark Airport Screeners Targeted Mexicans, THE STAR-LEDGER, (June
11, 2011), http://www.nj.com/news/index.ssf/2011/06/report_newark_airport_screener.html.
54
Steve Strunsky, TSA Fires 4 Screeners, Suspends Dozens in Wake of Probe at Newark
Liberty Airport, THE STAR LEDGER, (March 29, 2013), http://www.nj.com/news/index.ss
f/2013/03/tsa_announces_dismissals_suspe.html.
55
Jennifer Sinco Kelleher, TSA Investigates Profiling Allegations at Honolulu Airport,
CNSNEWS.COM, (Dec. 1, 2011), https://www.cnsnews.com/news/article/tsa-investigates-ho
nolulu-airport-allegations.
56
Airport Screening Procedures As Applied to Sikh Travelers and Your Rights as a Sikh Air
Traveler, THE SIKH COALITION: THE VOICE OF A PEOPLE (Oct. 7, 2013), http://www.sikh
coalition.org/documents/pdf/KYR-SikhTravelerBillofRights.pdf.
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For the sake of argument, let us stipulate that passengers from those
countries, in the aggregate, portend greater security risks than other demographics. The U.S. then has three options: elevated screenings for those
passengers, for all passengers, or for no passengers. On my approach, targeting all passengers may burden too many liberties, and targeting no passengers
may irresponsibly transgress against security concerns. Of course, the
empirical presupposition could well be false, in which case the argument
collapses; obviously it would only make more sense to differentially target if
the targeted group were more likely to carry security risks. The targeting of
Mexicans in Newark and Honolulu almost certainly fails this metric, and is
therefore illicit. But differential targeting should not be precluded full stop,
so long as the appropriate evidentiary basis is supplied.
With both the USA PATRIOT Act and aviation security, critics allege
that the infringements on liberty are intolerable, whether because liberties are
sacrosanct57 or just because these are the costs are too high for the benefits they
produce.58 While I find the first line of thinking radically implausible, the second
is certainly on the table; nothing thus far has contended otherwise. But in order
to assess its viability, we need a better conception of what hangs in the balance.
Certainly our liberties are important. My contention, though, is that our security
is undervalued, particularly by civil libertarians. Were a weightier account of
how to value security on offer, it could substantiate greater restrictions on liberty.
In the next section, I will attempt to develop such an account, particularly in the
context of terrorism and counterterrorism.
III. WHY SECURITY MATTERS
In order to understand whether security is worth the costs, we need to
know both what security costs and what it prevents. If the costs of security are
higher—whether economically or non-economically—than those incurred by
its absence, security’s costs are not justified.59 The preceding section explored
some of the costs of security in terms of liberty, but herein I propose that we
take a broader approach. In other words, security costs not just liberty; it has
other economic and non-economic costs as well. If security is to be justified, it
must be justified against the totality of its costs, which is just to say that security
57

See generally ACLU, supra note 20.
Charles C. Mann, Smoke Screening, VANITY FAIR, (Dec. 20, 2011), https://www.vanity
fair.com/culture/2011/12/tsa-insanity-201112.
59
In case this is not obvious, consider an agricultural example. Some hypothetical blight threatens
crops; it would cost $2M to eradicate the blight, but the crops are only worth $1M. The crops
should be left to wither because remediation is more expensive than the benefit. The same structural point applies to security with the caveat that both economic and non-economic costs matter.
58
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is more expensive than just its adverse effects on liberty. In the first part of this
section, I will paint a fuller conception of these costs, focusing on terrorism
and counterterrorism; roughly speaking, terrorism is the cost of security’s
absence and (effective) counterterrorism is the cost of security.60 In the second
part of this section, I will consider the complementary question of what costs
security redeems, or, to put it another way, the costs that a lack of security
would incur. The goal will be to characterize the absence of—or lessened—
security as quite expensive indeed, thus meaning that high costs of security are
more likely to be justified.61
Starting with the costs of terrorism, let us consider 9/11 as a dramatic
example. Following the work of Robert Looney, we might say that costs
either can be direct or indirect, as well as immediate, short-, mid-, or longterm.62 Immediate and short-term direct impacts, for example, were that
200,000 jobs in New York were destroyed or re-located out of New York, at
least temporarily. Destruction of physical assets was valued at over $16B;
rescue, clean-up, and related costs have been estimated at approximately
$11B. Immediate and short-term indirect costs included a slowing of
economic activity, with original projections putting the cost at as high as
$500B; the actual cost probably fell short of this.
In the mid- and long-term, the costs become indirect but still
substantial. Mid-term indirect costs include those to the insurance industry
($30B-$58B), airlines (tens of thousands of jobs and an overall devaluing of
the industry), tourism and other service industries (tens of thousands of jobs
60

Of course, a lack of security would have other adverse effects as well, such as ordinary (i.e.,
non-terroristic) crime. For the purposes of this paper, however, the approximation will suffice.
61
The ensuing argument is adapted from a different context. See FRITZ ALLHOFF, TERRORISM, TICKING TIME- BOMBS, AND TORTURE § 2.3 (2012).
62
Robert Looney, Economic Costs to the United States Stemming from the 9/11 Attacks,
STRATEGIC INSIGHTS (Aug. 2002), https://calhoun.nps.edu/bitstream/handle/10945/25404/
Economic_Costs_to_the_United_States_Stemming_From_the_911_Attacks.pdf?sequence=1.
See also Howard Kunreuther, et al., Assessing, Managing, and Financing Extreme Events:
Dealing with Terrorism, (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 10179, 2003),
http://www.nber.org/papers/w10179.pdf (putting the “inflicted damage” at $80B). Kunreuther,
et al. does not make clear where this figure comes from nor which damages are meant to be
included. I suspect that it does not include many of the long-term costs that Looney identifies,
which is why the estimate that I develop is significantly higher.
Another scholar assessed the global economic impact of “transnational terrorism”—as
well as the cost-effectiveness of our responses to it. TODD SANDLER, et al., Transnational
Terrorism, in GLOBAL CRISES, GLOBAL SOLUTIONS, 516-562 (Bjørn Lomberg, ed., 2009).
For a response, see S. BROCK BLOMBERG, The Copenhagen Consensus: Perspective Paper
on Transnational Terrorism Policies, in GLOBAL CRISES, GLOBAL SOLUTIONS, 563-576
(Bjørn Lomberg, ed., 2009) and WALTER ENDERS & TODD SANDLER, THE POLITICAL
ECONOMY OF TERRORISM (2005).
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and lowered equity value for hotels and other facilities), increased military
spending ($80B+), and so on. Long-term indirect costs include higher
operating costs (e.g., increased security), higher risk premiums (e.g., from
lenders to borrowers), shifting of resources from civilian to military forces,
shifting away from globalization, and so on.63 Putting dollar amounts on the
long-term costs is difficult, and even assessing the mid-term costs can be
challenging. Nevertheless, we might reasonably assess the economic costs of
9/11 to be somewhere in the vicinity of $500B-$1T.64
Included in these costs are the damages of the attacks—both direct
and indirect—as well as the counterterrorism measures that they spawned.
These can be usefully separated insofar as such a separation helps us get clear
on what we are spending to protect against something else. For fiscal year
(FY) 2003, additional spending of $48B was proposed for national defense,
as well as $38B more for homeland security.65 The defense budget has
continued to rise since 9/11—with wars in Iraq and Afghanistan playing a
significant role—and certainly some of this can reasonably be said to go to
counterterrorism.
But the best focus is probably on the Department of Homeland
Security (DHS), which was largely created to defend against terrorism.66 This
63

Looney, supra note 62, at 3.
None of these estimates include the Iraq war: would this war have taken place had 9/11
not? Assuming that the answer is no, then the price tag for that war gets added as an indirect
cost of 9/11, and that price tag is huge. Original estimates were ludicrously low—some as
low as $2B—with even the more “conservative” ones coming in at $100B-$200B. The actual
cost will be at least ten times that, and potentially as high as $3T. Linda J. Blimes & Joseph
E. Stiglitz, The Iraq War Will Cost Us $3 Trillion, and Much More, WASH. POST, Mar. 9,
2008, B01.
Nevertheless, there is something misleading about adding its costs to the 9/11 ledger,
especially if that ledger is meant to indicate the costs of terrorism: the Bush Administration
did not have to pursue Operation Iraqi Freedom and, regardless, its costs are more appropriately assigned to counterterrorism than to terrorism. (This is not to say that such costs can
be neatly assigned to either). I only raise this issue briefly because the Iraq war is an elephant
in the room as pertains to the consequences of 9/11; for the discussion that follows, nothing
substantive hangs on whether we count it as a cost thereof or not.
Operation Enduring Freedom (Afghanistan) also tallies a significant expense, though
probably only about 10% that of Operation Iraqi Freedom; estimates for the military efforts
in Afghanistan are just under $200B from 2001-2009. AMY BELASCO, CONG. RESEARCH
SERV., RL33110, THE COST OF IRAQ, AFGHANISTAN, AND OTHER GLOBAL WAR ON TERROR
OPERATIONS SINCE 9/11 2 (2008.)
65
Looney, supra note 62, at 2-3.
66
Its strategic plan, for example, says that the Department “was created to secure our country
against those who seek to disrupt the American way of life,” though it makes the further
provision that “our charter also includes preparation for and response to all hazards and
disasters.” One Team, One Mission, Securing Our Homeland: U.S. Department of Homeland
64
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Department serves other functions as well (e.g., security against illegal
immigration), but terrorism is a principal focus. A detailed analysis has been
carried out elsewhere,67 but some key results are worth noting. For example,
the cost of homeland security spending increased from $56B I n 2001 to
$99.5B in 2005. The federal outlays, which are easier to track the money
coming from other sources, are somewhere around half of the total in 2005
($53.4B), which represents 0.4% of the gross domestic product (GDP); this
represents a doubling since 2001 (0.2%) and a four-fold increase from the
period 1996-2001 (0.1%).68
Of the FY 2005 spending, approximately 8% went directly to
domestic counterterrorism, though much of the rest of the budget funds
related areas: protecting critical infrastructure and key assets (34%);
defending against catastrophic threats (15%); emergency preparedness and
response (11%); and intelligence and warning (1%). Only border and
transportation security (31%) is not majorly tied to counterterrorism, but
rather reflects the absorption of Immigration and Naturalization Services by
the DHS in 2003. Still, even this spending is relevant to counterterrorism
insofar as it funds our ability to keep terrorists out of the country in the first
place. Given this data, let us therefore conclude that, from 2001-2005, the US
was spending somewhere around $50B-$100B/year on counter-terrorism, not
including the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan.69 As the range clearly indicates,
this estimate is not meant to be precise, but rather aims to give us some broad
sense—at least within an order of magnitude—on what counterterrorism
costs us. And therein lies the question: is it worth it?
Some people clearly think not. For example, Jessica Wolfendale
argues that “we should fear counterterrorism more than we fear terrorism.”70
Her argument has two prongs: first, she argues that the risk of terrorism
simply is not that great and, second, that the costs of our counterterrorism
measures are higher than we think. On her thinking, once we adequately
Security Strategic Plan Fiscal Years 2008-2013, U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., 1, 2 (2008),
https://www.fdle.state.fl.us/Domestic-Security/Documents/DHSStrategicPlan2008-2013.aspx.
Elsewhere, it continues: “We will prevent and deter terrorist attacks and protect against and
respond to threats and hazards to the Nation. We will secure our national borders while
welcoming lawful immigrants, visitors, and trade.” Id. at 3.
67
Bart Hobijn & Erick Sager, What Has Homeland Security Cost? An Assessment: 20012005, Federal Reserve Bank of New York, 13 CURRENT ISSUES IN ECONOMICS AND FINANCE
2, 1-7 (2007).
68
Id. at 1-2.
69
Again, for a more rigorous economic analysis of the worldwide costs of terrorism see
SANDLER, supra note 62 and Blomberg, supra note 62.
70
Jessica Wolfendale, Terrorism, Security, and the Threat of Counterterrorism, 30 STUD. IN
CONFLICT & TERRORISM 75, 75-92 (2007).
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understand the (lesser) costs of terrorism and the (higher) costs of counterterrorism, we will see that the latter are not justified; they just do not provide
a positive return. She takes issue with the hubris of, for example, President
George W. Bush and Colin Powell, who have said, respectively, that terrorism threatens not only our lives but also “our way of life” and our
“civilization.”71 But does it? Consider:
On average only 420 people are killed and another 1249 are
injured each year from transnational terrorist attacks.
Nevertheless, the public in rich countries views transnational
terrorism as one of the greatest threats. This is rather ironic
since over 30,000 people die on US highways annually, yet
highway safety is not as much of a public concern.72
Or, more viscerally:
. . . the estimated 1,000-7,000 yearly deaths from terrorism
pales in to insignificance next to the 40,000 people who die
every day from hunger, the 500,000 people who are killed
every year by light weapons and the millions who die annually
from diseases like influenza (3.9 million annual deaths), HIVAIDS (2.9 million annual deaths), diarrhoeal (2.1 million
annual deaths) and tuberculosis (1.7 million annual deaths).73
Or, economically:
Since 2001, the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis, and
Malaria, funded by all willing governments and devoted to
combating diseases that kill about 6 million people each year,
has committed about $6.9 billion and spent about $4.4 billion.
This expenditure comes to roughly $120 per fatality. Between
2001 and 2006, the US Government alone has spent $438
billion on the war on terror. This amount comes to roughly
$146 million per US fatality—over a million times more per
fatality.74
71

Id. (quoting RICHARD JACKSON, WRITING THE WAR ON TERROR:
AND COUNTER-TERRORISM 99 (Manchester University Press, 2005)).
72
SANDLER, supra note 62.
73
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Wolfendale, supra note 70, at 77 (citation omitted) (quotations omitted) (emphasis in original).
Thomas Pogge, Making War on Terrorists—Reflections on Harming the Innocent, 16 J.
OF POL. PHIL. 1, 1-2 (2008). See also Belasco, supra note 65. Note that Belasco’s sum does
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These statistics are meant to show that terrorism poses less of a threat than
we think it does, or at least that the threat from terrorism pales in comparison
to various other threats that we seem to care a lot less about. How then can
our substantial response to terrorism be justified?
The answer to this question depends on what terrorism threatens. The
statistics are, most directly, about the number of lives that stand to be lost,
whether through terrorism, highway safety, hunger, war, or disease. But
certainly terrorism threatens more than just lives; we should not merely
observe that terrorism comes up short on the “ledger of lives” and thereafter
deprioritize our response to it. As indicated above, the economic costs of 9/11
are staggering, way more than the 30,000 lives lost to highway accidents.
Economic costs are one sort of value and lives are another; even if you think,
as actuaries might, that these latter values can be rendered economically, this
picture is still radically incomplete.75
In particular, it fails to appreciate other critical costs of terrorism: its
symbolic costs. A few thousand people died on 9/11, and the economic impact
of that day was catastrophic. Lives and dollars aside, though, that day cost us
much more that those numbers could express. The terrorists destroyed the
World Trade Center, a central icon of our economic strength. They crashed
into the Pentagon, a building that represents our military strength. And, were it
not for the brave passengers who helped crash United 93 in rural Pennsylvania,
a plane probably would have hit either the White House or the Capitol,
buildings that embody the strength of our government. These symbolic attacks
against our economy, military, and government were chosen precisely because
of that symbolism; as many or more lives—and perhaps similar economic
damages—could have as easily been exacted through other targets.
While many Americans are personally unaffected by the tragedy of
30,000 annual highway deaths, few of us could say the same of 9/11. It adversely
affected our collective sense of safety. It took away our sense of place in the
world. It left us vulnerable at the individual, institutional, and national levels.
Even a cynic who belabors the failings of American culture, our inappropriate
smugness, our inappropriate relationship with the rest of the world, or our
arrogance must nevertheless acknowledge that our collective suffering, even if
not include all the costs of 9/11, but only money that Congress has approved “for military
operations, base security, reconstruction, foreign aid, embassy costs, and veterans’ health
care for the three operations initiated since the 9/11 attacks: Operation Enduring Freedom
(OEF) Afghanistan and other counter terror operations; Operation Noble Eagle (ONE),
providing enhanced security at military bases; and Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF).” Belasco,
supra note 64, at 2. In other words, Belasco provides only a partial accounting of our
counterterrorism spending.
75
And Wolfendale agrees. Wolfendale, supra note 70, at 80-2.
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ill-founded, is a substantial harm. And, again, this is not to deny that we should
care more about, for example, pharmaceuticals in the developing world, or even
that we have a moral obligation to support poor countries. Rather, the point is
simply that terrorism takes more than lives and dollars.
Nevertheless, there is a hazard in developing an account of terrorism
or counterterrorism that depends too strongly on 9/11: this is, at least in terms
of lives and excluding military bombings during war, perhaps the most spectacular single-day terrorist attack ever.76 We must be careful not to exaggerate
76

Other significant transnational terror attacks include:

Date
July 22, 1946

Event
Perpetrator
Bombing of local British military head- Irgun Zai Leumi
quarters at King David Hotel, Jerusalem

August 2, 1980

Bombing of Bologna railway station

October 23, 1983

Suicide truck bombing of US
Marines' barracks, Beirut

June 23, 1985

Deaths
91

Armed Revolutionary 84
Nuclei
Hezbollah
241

Downing of Air India 182, en route
from Montreal to London
December 21, 1988 Downing of Pan Am 103, en route
from London to New York
September 19,1989 Downing of Union des Transports
772, en route from Brazzaville
(Republic of the Congo) to Paris

Sikh extremists

March 12, 1993

Pakistani agents

317

Al-Qaeda

223

Al-Qaeda

2,974
(plus 19
hijackers)

Jemaah Islamiyah

202

Al-Qaida

190

Chechen rebels

344

Thirteen bombings in Bombay

August 7, 1998

Simultaneous bombings of US
embassies in Nairobi, Kenya and
Dar es Salaam, Tanzania
September 11, 2001 Four suicide hijackings that crashed
into the World Trade Center, the
Pentagon, and a field in Pennsylvania

329

Libyan intelligence 270
agent
Hezbollah
171

.

October 12, 2002
March 11, 2004

Two bombs outside Bali nightclubs

Bombing of Madrid commuter
trains and stations during morning
hour hostage seizure of school
September 1, 2004 rush
Barricade
children and parents in Belan,
North Ossetia-Alania (Russia)
.

ALLHOFF, supra note 61, at 33 n.40 (adapted from SANDLER, supra note 62). See also Chris
Quillen, A Historical Analysis of Mass Casualty Bombers, 25.5 STUD. IN CONFLICT &
TERRORISM 279, 279-92 (2002) (providing data from which this chart was adapted); Chris
Quillen, Mass Casualty Bombings Chronology, 25.5 STUD. IN CONFLICT & TERRORISM 293,
293-302 (2002)) (same).
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the (ongoing) risks of terrorism by appeal to a singular event and one that will
probably not recur, regardless of our counterterrorism strategies. Or, to put it
another way, how likely is it that our investment in counterterrorism since
9/11 prevented anything like it from happening since? Or even some
constellation of attacks that would collectively approximate 9/11's damage?
This is a hard question, and the associative counter-factual reasoning—i.e.,
what would have happened had we not done such and so—is perilous.77
Nevertheless, at least a few substantive points can be made.
First, 9/11 was so bad that any individual or constellation of attacks
even an order of magnitude off from it would still be heinous. If, for example,
our counterterrorism has prevented an aggregated 10% of 9/11's losses, this
is very substantial. Second, there were semi-regular terrorist attacks against
the U.S. over the two decades preceding 9/11. Marines’ barracks in Beirut
were targeted by two truck bombs (1983); two-thirds of the victims of Pan
Am 103 were American (1988); two U.S. embassies were bombed (1998); and
then came 9/11 (2001).78 The bombings of the Federal building in Oklahoma
City killed 168 people (1995), though this attack was different in the sense
that it was domestic—as opposed to transnational—terrorism; regardless, the
effects were as real. All told, this is five serious attacks from 1983-2001. In
fact, there was not a single successful attack between 9/11 and the Boston
Note that the bombings in Jerusalem (1946) and Beirut (1983) were against
military installations, so it is questionable whether these bombings should
count as terroristic. The American soldiers in Beirut were mostly Marines,
ostensibly there on a peacekeeping mission; some Lebanese Muslims instead saw them as a faction in the ongoing civil war. Whether peacekeeping
or humanitarian forces are properly understood as noncombatant lies outside
the scope of this project, but an argument in the affirmative can certainly be
made. The bombing of Jerusalem's King David Hotel was carried out by the
Irgun, an underground Zionist organization that was responding to British
action under Operation Agatha (or “Black Saturday”); the British coordinated searches and arrests in various Jewish cities and settlements, as well
at the Jewish Agency (i.e., the pre-state Jewish government). While the
British forces were headquartered in the hotel, so were various other administrative and government contingents. At least some of the casualties were
therefore noncombatants, though some were clearly military command. In
either case, determinations as to whether the bombings were terroristic does
not matter for present purposes, but provocative issues are raised in both.
ALLHOFF, supra note 61, at 33 n.40.
77
For discussion of a sophisticated attempt, see SANDLER, supra note 62.
78
It is worth acknowledging that, while these four attacks were primarily against Americans,
three of them took place abroad. How effective would our counterterrorism campaign—especially under the auspices of the Department of Homeland Security—been in preventing them?
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Marathon bombings;79 this was the longest period of safety that we had
enjoyed in thirty years.80 The paucity of successful attacks since the proliferation of our powerful counterterrorism campaign can hardly be a coincidence.
So let us now assume that our counterterrorism campaign has worked,
without committing ourselves to any substantive view about whether it is
optimal; surely nothing in the real world is. This then brings us to the second
of Wolfendale's concerns, which is that the costs of counterterrorism, even if
successful, are nevertheless high. And these costs are not just the economic
ones previously discussed, which we might charitably assume are reasonably
justified. Rather, there are all sorts of other potential costs, such as the hazards
pertaining to the sort of people and nation that we have become in responding
to terrorism.81 As discussed in § 2, we have restricted liberties, of which the
USA PATRIOT Act and aviation security are only the most visible examples.
This is at least prima facie bad, no doubt. But the central question is whether
such harms—whether against liberty and more generally (e.g., catalyzing of
anti-American sentiment, inchoate terrorist threats, etc.)—can be justified
given countervailing benefits.
IV. BALANCING LIBERTY AND SECURITY
In § 1, the tension between liberty and security was adjudicated by
conceiving of them as commensurable and then seeking to balance their
competing interests against each other. Roughly speaking, if a small infringement on liberty were worth a large gain in security, that infringement could
be justified. Conversely, a large infringement on liberty that only provided a
small benefit to security would not be justified. Of course, different people
79

While discussion of the Boston Marathon bombings would take me too far afield, there
are various ways in which this attack is particularly worrisome from a security perspective.
If the Tsarnaev brothers acted independently, their bombings might portend a new era of
grass-roots and low-tech terrorism (e.g., garage-made bombs). There are various ways in
which this sort of terrorism is harder to combat than terrorism perpetuated by broader
networks, the most obvious being simply knowing who the adversary is. A multiplicity of
de-centralized adversaries makes surveillance much harder, including acquisition of informants, monitoring of financials, and so on.
80
The Fort Hood shootings are one potential exception. However, I doubt that the shooter,
Dr. Nidal Malik Hasan, was acting on any ideological grounds and was instead just disturbed
about his pending deployment to Afghanistan. Absent ideological aims, I would not classify
this act as terroristic. For more discussion, see ALLHOFF, supra note 62, at §1.5.
81
A particular concern in this regard is the loss of innocent life effected by counterterrorist
operations. See, e.g., Jane Meyer, The Predator War: What Are the Risks of the C.I.A.’s
Covert Drone Program?, THE NEW YORKER (Oct. 26, 2009), http://www.newyorker.com/
reporting/2009/10/26/091026fa_fact_mayer?printable=true.
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would reasonably disagree about the relative weights to assign to these
infringements and benefits. Therefore, the political process is tasked with
aggregating the values of its polity and rendering an outcome (i.e., counting
up the chips and seeing which side has more).82 They key to this approach is
that benefits to security must be balanced against losses to liberty; the trick is
attaching values to each—though note the heuristic model suggested in § 1—
not in what knowing to do with those values once they are discerned.
Such an approach has been criticized, and, in this last section of the
paper, some engagement with those criticisms is owed. Most generally, the
disagreement comes from rights theorists. Their move is to say that liberties
stand outside a broader calculus under which those liberties can be traded for
other social goods. Rather, it is inherent in the very nature of liberties that
they are trumps83 (or side constraints)84 against competing social goods. In
other words, liberties inevitably win out in a conflict because of what liberties
are; to hold otherwise substantially misunderstands their very nature.85
For example, imagine some restaurant with a racist clientele. And
further imagine that the racist proclivities of this clientele pit the economic
prospects of the restaurant against the accommodation of minorities; at most,
one of these values can be realized.86 At least for many, no balancing test is
due the economic interests against the anti-discrimination interests. Rather,
the anti-discrimination interests trump—and are therefore incommensurable
with—the economic interests. If this analysis sounds right here, what
distinguishes the security context?87
82

For a skeptical view, see generally Mark Neocleous, Security, Liberty and the Myth of Balance:
Towards a Critique of Security Politics, 6 CONTEMPORARY POLITICAL THEORY 131 (2007).
83
RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY, xi (Harvard University Press, 1977).
84
Nozick, supra note 5, at 28-33.
85
Jeremy Waldron, Security and Liberty: The Image of Balance, 11 J. OF POL. PHIL. 196
(2003). For more discussion, see Kleinig, supra note 1, at 372-373; STANLEY I. BENN, A
THEORY OF FREEDOM (Cambridge University Press, 1988).
86
For somewhat similar fact pattern, see Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964)
(holding that that Civil Rights Act of 1964 could be upheld under Congress’s commerce
power). Our discussion, however, is more broadly normative than legal.
87
Waldron uses a somewhat different example to make the same point. He imagines having
made a promise to meet with a student, then being invited by a friend to lunch. Waldron, supra
note 85, at 195-96. According to Waldron, how delicious the lunch would be is irrelevant to
whether the promise to the student can be broken. Id. Per below, I disagree with this analysis;
the promise is kept because its value almost always outweighs the value of (even a really
delicious) lunch, not because promises are lexically prior to lunches. On my view, were
Waldron to be whisked from his office at NYU up to midtown for lunch at Per Se, he might be
justified in breaking a casual commitment (i.e., if lunch mattered a lot and the promise did not),
a possibility that his analysis forecloses. See also JOSEPH RAZ, PRACTICAL REASONS AND
NORMS 37 (1999) (siding with Waldron).
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First, the conclusion of the analysis can still be accommodated under a
balancing approach, which would be my preference. On this approach, the
economic interests of the restaurant pale in comparison to anti-discrimination,
so the restaurant gets forcibly integrated against its owner’s wishes.88 Second—
as we saw in § 3—security portends far deeper values than mere economic ones.
So, even if the economic values lose to liberties here, it does not follow that
liberties always win (i.e., as against weightier values). Robert Nozick famously
championed the priority of rights, but was far more agnostic about their
preeminence in cases of “catastrophic moral horror,”89 which are exactly the
cases that terrorism threatens. Being able to accommodate other important
values does not diminish the value of liberties. Rather, it only recognizes that,
at least in some contexts, other values reach their maximal expression.
More specifically, Jeremy Waldron finds the balancing approach to
liberty and security wanting, particularly if it entails a commitment that, post
9/11, those “who care about civil liberties need to realign balances between
security and freedom.”90 This thinking implies that we learned something on
9/11 that we did not know on 9/10, namely that greater value is due our security
than we previously thought, and that value is to be redeemed at the expense of
our liberties.91 Waldron finds this realignment problematic for four reasons.
First, as above, he is skeptical of a calculus that integrates liberty and security.
Second, he worries as to how the burdens on liberties are distributed; a harm may
arise if those burdens are differentially absorbed.92 Third, he says that restrictions
88

Of course, we can develop hypotheticals to make this a closer case. Suppose a racist, wealthy
patron offers a $1M catering contract on the sole condition that the owner excludes some
particular minority client from the event. Furthermore, suppose the owner is $1M in debt and
faces imminent foreclosure; the catering contract—and its Faustian bargain—is the only
opportunity to evade bankruptcy. Furthermore, the anti-discrimination context can be broader
than just race-based discrimination. The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari in
Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colorado Civil Rights Com’n. 137 S.Ct. 2290 (2016). In this case,
Jack Phillips, the proprietor of a Christian bakery, has refused to make cakes for gay weddings.
After losing subsequent litigation, Phillips no longer makes cakes for any weddings and has
claimed financial hardship as a result. Of course this case introduces another axis (viz., religious
liberty) beyond the two already mentioned here (viz., economic interests and anti-discrimination).
89
Nozick, supra note 5, at 30.
90
Waldron, supra note 85, at 192 (quoting Nicholas Kristof, Liberal Reality Check: We Must
Look Anew at Freedom vs. Security, PITTSBURGH-POST GAZETTE (June 2, 2002) at A09).
91
Waldron, supra note 85, at 192-93. Kleinig argues that the problem prior to 9/11 was not a lack
of balance between liberty and security, but rather the lack of functionality of extant security
mechanisms. Kleinig, supra note 1. In other words, security need not come at the expense of liberty,
but rather can be improved independently. Surely this is correct, and I agree that we should not
burden liberty if gains to security can otherwise be realized. However, the present focus is on when
the tension between the two is irreconcilable and one can only be had at the expense of the other.
92
See also Kleing, supra note 1, at 374.
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on liberties may have unintended effects, including adverse effects on security.
And, fourth, he cautions that symbolic—as opposed to substantive—consequences for security are inadequate to license infringements on liberty.93
Having already commented on the first concern, let me briefly comment
on the second and third before spending more time on the fourth. With regards
to the second, of course the distribution of burdens matters; this issue arose in §
2.2 with regards to aviation security (cf., differential treatment of ethnic and
religious minorities), and I was sympathetic. However, this consideration can
easily be accounted for in the balancing approach: distributive inequities are
costly. Recall that my balancing approach is pluralistic, countenancing both
economic and non-economic costs; these inequities carry (at least) a moral cost
and that counts against them. If the facts on the ground came out a certain way,
maybe this cost could be sustained as against greater benefits, but that hardly
carries us down the road to Korematsu.94
With regards to the third, the unintended and adverse effects of
security matter, but so do the unintended and adverse effects of liberty; one
only has to think of the travesties in Aurora and Newtown to see liberty gone
awry.95 Waldron considers just one side of the coin in this regard, which ends
up skewing his results. In other words, granting Waldron’s point that
unintended effects complicate the balancing approach, such complications
can be marshaled against liberty as well as in its favor. Furthermore, there is
no principled reason to think that liberty should be asymmetrically privileged
as against security in this regard. Overall, though, there need not be any
particular disagreement between Waldron and me on these two issues; maybe
we tally things up differently, but we can otherwise agree.
With regards to his fourth concern, the disagreement is more substantial. His condescension for the public is palpable:
[In response to terrorist attacks,] people want to feel that something is being done….People are less interested in the effectiveness of these [responses] than in the sense that something striking
93

Waldron, supra note 85, at 194-95.
See Kleing, supra note 1.
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See, e.g., Jennifer Brown, 12 Shot Dead, 58 Wounded in Aurora Movie Theater during Batman
Premier, DENVER POST, (July 20, 2012), http://www.denverpost.com/news/ci_21124893/12shot-dead-58-wounded-aurora-movie-theater (discussing the mass shooting in Aurora, CO). See
also James Barron, Children Were All Shot Multiple Times with a Semiautomatic, Officials Say,
N.Y TIMES, (Dec. 16, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/12/16/nyregion/gunman-kills-20children-at-school-in-connecticut-28-dead-in-all.html (discussing the mass shooting in Sandy
Hook); Michael Waldman, The Second Amendment: A Biography (2004) (discussing contemporary gun violence, including the mass shootings in Aurora, CO and Sandy Hook, CT).
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and unusual is being done. No doubt the psychological reassurance that people derive from this is a consequential gain from the
loss of liberty. But whether it is the sort of gain that should count
morally is another question.96
For one, Waldron makes an empirical claim with no apparent empirical basis,
namely that people are more interested that something be done in response to
terrorism than that it be effective. Why think this is true? Of course people want
there to be a response to terrorism, but, for all Waldron says, they could be
completely indifferent as to whether that response was effective or not; its mere
existence placates. This has to be a non-starter since indifference between an
ineffective response and an effective one is not even psychologically viable.
More substantively, he wonders whether psychological assurance
constitutes a moral gain. So imagine here that people somehow feel safer from
a terrorist threat, but that, in reality, they are not. It is hard to know what sort
of facts could vindicate this premise; in general, the two would track together.
But, for the sake of argument, suppose that liberties are restricted, people feel
safer, and yet they are not. Apparently, the balancing test gets this wrong and
justifies the restriction on liberties. But why? What is being balanced is liberty
and security; if there is no security, then the liberties should not be restricted.
Or so goes one reply to Waldron. My preference is to be more ambitious
and to allow that psychological reassurance counts toward the value of security.
Security therefore has two components, both objective and subjective. And it
finds its maximal expression when people are safe, and believe themselves to
be. From this maximal expression, it would be worse if either they were less safe,
or if they believed they were. It is therefore indeterminate which is better: (1)
people who are not safe, but believe they are; or (2) people who are safe, but
believe they are not. Since security—whether objectively or subjectively—is
more appropriately measured on a spectrum than bivalently, we can imagine
myriad interplays between these two dimensions. In any case, I reject Waldron’s
dubiousness than psychological reassurance matters.
All told, even Waldron concedes that his arguments are not dispositive
against a balancing approach, only that such an approach merits “care and
caution” moving forward.97 With this, I agree. Restrictions on liberty should not
be taken lightly, whether for the sake of security or otherwise. Liberties matter,
as do the distributions and unintended effects of their curtailment. When we
restrict liberties, we should do so only for good reason. Waldron and I might
disagree as to what those reasons are—e.g., whether subjective security counts—
but there need not be any disagreement on the broader methodology.
96
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Waldron, supra note 85, at 209 (emphasis in original).
Id.

